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"THE PLACE OF THE WRONG"
TORTS AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
GEORGE W. STUMBERG*
In an article published in 1951, a well-known English authority on
conflict of laws remarked, "To a foreign observer, it seems extraor-
dinary that there should be so much uncertainty in the United States
as to what law governs the validity of a contract, and so much un-
critical acceptance of the rule that tort liability is governed by the
law of the place of wrong."' The writer was referring, of course, to
the rule embodied in the Restatement of Conflict of Laws, according
to which the place of the wrong is that place where the tortious con-
duct of the defendant has its impact on the injured person or property
The Restatement rule is undoubtedly supported by most respectable
authority2 It is also the rule which has been the most often resorted
to by American courts when they have had occasion to deal with
"foreign torts."4 However, any open minded observer would be com-
pelled to concede that its strict application has at times brought about
somewhat strange results.
Such a result appears to have been reached in a relatively recent
Texas case.5 In this case, Jackson Tiller, a resident of Texas, had
invited William Carter and his wife, also residents of Texas, to ride
in his plane from Artesia, New Mexico, to El Paso, Texas. The plane
overshot El Paso and made a forced landing deep into Northern
Mexico. When an attempt was made to take off in rough terrain, the
plane crashed causing serious injuries to Mrs. Carter. Suit for the
injury was brought in a Texas district court where recovery was denied.
Upon appeal the holding of the lower court was affirmed. The grounds
given were that since this was a Mexican tort the law of Mexico con-
trolled, but the remedy given by Mexican la* was said to be too
* Professor of Law, University of Texas.
'Morris, The Proper Law of A Tort, 64 HARv. L. REv. 883 (1951). J. H. C. Morris
is Fellow and Tutor of Magdalen College, Oxford, and All Souls Lecturer in Private
International Law at Oxford. He was visiting professor at Harvard Law School in
1950-51.
2 P .TATEmENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1934).
3 See BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS, chapter 9 (1935), and GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF
LAws, chapter 6 (3d ed. 1949).
'In addition to Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1904) ; see Le Forest
v. Tolman, 117 Mass. 109, 19 Am. Rep. 400 (1875) ; Mike v. Lian, 322 Pa. 353, 185 Atl.
775 (1936) ; Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253 (1933). Cf. the dissent in Eastern Air
Lines v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62 (1955), involving the federal tort claims act.
In the Eastern Air Lines case a divided court held that the place of the negligent
conduct and not the place of injury governed the extent of the liability of the United
States.
5 Carter v. Tillery, 257 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953.)
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dissimilar from that afforded under the law of Texas to permit its
application by a Texas court. The court relied on earlier Texas cases"
which in turn followed closely a pattern set by Mr. Justice Holmes
in Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R.7
It may be recalled that in the Slater case a brakeman, an American
citizen, had been killed while on his job in Nuevo Laredo, Mexico.
Suit was brought by his widow in a federal court in Texas. Upon
appeal Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the court, took the position
that when suit is brought for a foreign wrong, the forum gives effect
to the right created by the foreign law through resort to its local pro-
cedural devices. To paraphrase the language employed by him, the
foreign law creates an obligation which follows the defendant wherever
he may be found.' However, as a concomitant of a theory of enforce-
ment of a foreign created right, the further position was that the forum
cannot diminish or enlarge an obligation created by the proper foreign
law. Although under Mexican law the widow would have been entitled
to annuities for life, subject to certain contingencies, a decree for
similar annuities could not be entered by a federal court sitting in
Texas. To enter a judgment for a lump sum based on the present
value of what the widow would ultimately get from a Mexican tribunal
would be to award her something other than that to which she was
entitled under the law of Mexico. However, the facts of the Carter
case are quite different from those of Slater.
In Carter all the parties concerned were residents of Texas. In
Slater the defendant was a national railway operating in Mexico.
SSee Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Richards, 68 Tex. 375, 4 S.W. 627 (1887) ; Mexican
Nat'l Ry. v. Jackson, 89 Tex. 107, 33 S.W. 857 (1896). In 1917 the Texas legislature
sought to change the former Texas rule that the foreign law, to be applicable and
therefore enforceable, must not be substantially different from Texas law. However,
in El Paso & Juarez Traction Co. v. Carruth, 255 S.W. 159 (Tex. Comm. App. 1923),
it was held that the legislation did not apply to injuries incurred in Mexico. See in
this connection, Stumberg, Conflict of Laws-Torts-Texas DecisionS, 9 TEXAs L.
REv. 21 (1930). It might be added that formerly American courts frequently stated
that no effect would be given at the forum to foreign law if that law is substantially
different from the law at the forum. This notion seems to have survived only in Texas
and there only as to Mexican law.
7194 U.S. 120 (1904).
8 It should be noted that Mr. Justice Holmes did not write in terms of injury but
of conduct as the important factor in determining responsibility. In cases involving
conflicts problems other than tort, the learned justice usually ignored the theory of
enforcement of foreign created rights. In Union Trust Co., v. Grosman, 245 U.S. 412(1918), for example, he held that a married woman's promise, enforceable under the
law of the state where it was entered into, could not be enforced in a federal court in
Texas, because the policy of that state was to make agreements by Texas married
women unenforceable in Texas no matter where the agreement had been entered into.
According to the Restatement, the validity of a contract is determined by the law of




Furthermore, in Slater the conduct which led to the death of the brake-
man took place in Mexico, whereas in Carter the original conduct
which culminated in the injury to Mrs. Carter took place in the United
States, apparently in Texas, where available testimony would have
shown that the plane went off course. Again, in Slater the widow could
have successfully made her claim under Mexican law in Mexico, but
Mrs. Carter could make no claim under Mexican law in Mexico be-
cause no Mexican tribunal had jurisdiction over the defendant, an
American citizen not amenable to suit in that country.' What the court
in the Carter case in effect said to the plaintiff was: "Since the physical
injury was incurred in Mexico, this is a Mexican tort; therefore
Mexican law controls; we cannot give effect to Mexican law because
it is too unlike our law." Thus because of the plaintiff's inability to
get redress in either Texas or in Mexico the defendant was permitted
to escape liability completely.
However, was this a "Mexican wrong"? Neither the Texas plaintiffs
nor the Texas defendant when they boarded the plane in New Mexico
contemplated a trip that would take them to Mexico. Indeed all the
facts excepting one, the physical injury, were non-Mexican. The
physical injury, the only connecting link with Mexico, was, at least
so it was contended,10 the result of the defendant's negligence on the
American side of the Rio Grande. Further, it is by no means certain
that Mr. Justice Holmes would have treated the situation as one in-
volving a Mexican wrong since in the Slater and other cases he repeat-
edly wrote in terms of conduct without emphasis on the place of the
injury as the important factor or connecting link in fixing tort responsi-
bility.-1
There is undoubtedly something attractive about selecting the place
of the injury as the proper point of reference for tort liability. That
place, where the alleged tortious activity came into physical contact
with the injured person or property, is relatively easy to ascertain.
After the trier of fact has ascertained the locality of the harm, the
case can be automatically put into an ever ready slot with only a
minimum of physical and mental effort. However, an easily travelled
path does not necessarily lead to the most desirable destination. For
9 It was so contended by the plaintiff, whose expert on Mexican law so testified.10 Since the case was not permitted to go to trial the plaintiff did not have an
opportunity to introduce evidence to this effect. In the trial and appellate brief,
counsel emphasized that there was negligence in going off course in Texas.
11 Cf. "The theory . .. is that, although the act complained of was subject to no
law having force in the forum, it gave rise to an obligation. . . ." Slater v. Mexican
Nat'l R.R., supra n. 7, at 582. See also cases, nn. 7 and 8 supra.
[VoL. 34
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this reason quite a few courts have not always adhered blindly to the
place of injury rule.
The Carter case might be contrasted with Schmidt v. Driscoll
Hotel," decided by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in 1957. The
defendant, the operator of a bar in St. Paul, Minnesota, illegally sold
intoxicating liquor to one Sorrensen who at the time was already in-
toxicated. Shortly thereafter the plaintiff was injured in Wisconsin
while riding with Sorrensen in his automobile. He sued in Minnesota
under the "Minnesota Dram Shop Act", which, if applicable, would
impose responsibility on the defendant. After concluding that even
if Wisconsin had had a law similar to that of Minnesota, which it did
not, such a Wisconsin law would probably be held by the Wisconsin
courts not to impose liability on the Minnesota defendant because
the illegal sale was not made in Wisconsin, the Minnesota Supreme
Court upheld recovery on the following grounds:
We feel that the principles in Restatement, Conflict of Laws, §§ 377
and 378, should not be held applicable to fact situations such as the
present to bring about the result described and that a determination
to the opposite effect would be more in conformity with principles of
equity and justice. Here all parties involved were residents of Minne-
sota. Defendant was licensed under its laws and required to operate
its establishment in compliance therewith. Its violation of the Minne-
sota statutes occurred here, and its wrongful conduct was complete
within Minnesota when, as a result thereof, Sorrenson became intoxi-
cated before leaving its establishment. The consequential harm to
plaintiff, a Minnesota citizen, accordingly should be compensated for
under M.S.A. § 340.95 which furnishes him a remedy against de-
fendant for its wrongful acts. By this construction, no greater burden
is placed upon defendant than was intended by § 340.95.
The position of the Minnesota court is by no means an isolated one.
Other courts in other situations have concluded that the law of the
place of the injury should not under the circumstances be given local
effect. The holding in Gordon v. Parker8 is an example. An action
for alienation of affections was brought in a federal court in Massa-
chusetts. The plaintiff and his wife were domiciled in Pennsylvania.
The defendant's activities took place in Massachusetts. It was con-
tended that Pennsylvania law, which does not allow recovery for
alienation of affections, should control because Pennsylvania, as the
12249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W2d 365 (1957).
Is 83 F. Supp. 40 (1949). See also O'Connor v. Johnson, 74 F. Supp. 370 (1947),
involving a breach of promise to marry, where New York law under which there was
no liability, rather than Virginia law, was given effect on a theory of local policy.
New York, of course, was the forum.
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marital domicile, was the place of the impact of the defendant's con-
duct. In the course of the opinion the court came to the following
conclusions:
This is not a situation in which the interests of Pennsylvania plainly
outweigh those of Massachusetts. The social order of each is impli-
cated. As the place of matrimonial domicile, Pennsylvania has an
interest in whether conduct in any part of the world is held to affect
adversely the marriage relationship between its domiciliaries. But, as
the place where the alleged... wrongdoer lives, Massachusetts also
has an interest. She is concerned with conduct within her borders
which in her view lowers the standards of the community where they
occur. She also is concerned when her citizens intermeddle with other
people's marriages.
The case of Grant v. McAuliffe " is another relatively recent example
of a departure from the thesis that the law of the place of injury
necessarily controls the matter of liability. The plaintiffs, residents
of California, were injured in Arizona as the result of the negligence
of a driver of a car. The driver, a resident of California, died. Under
the law of Arizona a cause of action for personal injury does not
survive the death of the tort feasor. Under the law of California it
does. A claim against the estate of the decedent was made in Cali-
fornia. In upholding the claim Judge Traynor, speaking for the
California Supreme Court, concluded that "[wihen, as in the present
case, all of the parties were residents of this state, and the estate of
the deceased tort feasor is being administered in this state, plaintiff's
right to prosecute their causes of action is governed by the laws of
this state relating to administration of estates."'"
Again, in Levy v. Daniels U-Drive Auto Renting Co.,,6 where the
matter was one of the responsibility of the bailor of an automobile
for an injury inflicted by the bailee, the law of Connecticut where the
bailment was entered into, rather than that of Massachusetts where
14 41 Cal. App.2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953). Noted, U.C.L.A. L. REv. 380 (1954) ;
68 Hatv. L. REv. 1260 (1955); 27 So. CAL. L. REv. 468 (1954). Cf. Herzog v. Stem,
264 N.Y. 379, 191 N.E. 23 (1934). The plaintiff and the decedent resided in New York.
The injury was incurred in Virginia where the cause of action survived. Recovery
was denied because there would be no survival in New York where suit was brought.
- A contrary result was reached in Orr v. Ahern, 107 Conn. 174, 139 Atl. 691
.(1928). The injury was incurred in New York under the law of which, at the time,
ere was no survival. Suit against the administrator was in Connecticut where the
cause of action survived the death of the defendant. The Connecticut court denied
recovery because none could be had at the place of the wrong.
16108 Conn. 333, 143 Atl. 163, Annot., 61 A.L.R. 648 (1928). But see Young v.
Masci, 289 U.S. 253 (1933). Noted 47 HARv. L. Rv. 349 (1933): 18 MiNN. L. REv.
350 (1954) ; 12 Tax. L. REv. 87 (1933). The car was bailed in New Jersey. The bailee
caused injury to the plaintiff in New York. The New Jersey court held the bailor
liable through resort to New York law as the law of the "place of the wrong." The
Supreme Court affirmed.
[VoL. 34
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the injury was incurred, was held to control upon the ground "that
the liability of persons renting motor vehicles" was made "a part of
every contract of hiring a motor vehicle in Connecticut."
An area where courts have encountered considerable difficulty in
applying the law of the place of the impact is that of slander and
libel. National publications and broadcasting stations reach readers
or listeners throughout the United States, sometimes in foreign coun-
tries as well. According to the Restatement, a tort occurs in each state
where there has been a publication. This, according to the Restate-
ment, is where the spoken or written words are heard or read." The
result is that under the place of injury rule there may be an accumula-
tion of as many as fifty or more torts if the alleged slander or libel
contained in the broadcast or magazine article reaches the entire
United States. Apparently the Restatement rule would permit the
law of place of publication to control with respect to each publication
such matters as the slanderous or libelous nature of the publication,
privileged publication and the amount of the damages recoverable.
It would seem here that in order to avoid hopeless confusion and
multiplicity of suits it would be a better practice for purposes of con-
flict of laws for a forum to seek out the place where the plaintiff is
likely to incur the most harm, such as the place where he lives or the
place where he has his principal place of business and then to allow
only a single action based on the law of that place. This some courts
have done."'
Interspousal responsibility for personal injuries inflicted by one
spouse on the other is another area where courts have not always
enforced "a right created by the law" of the place of injury. Insofar
as results are concerned, the decided cases seem to fall into three
categories.19 First, when suit has been at the marital domicile, re-
covery has not been allowed if under the law of the place of the injury
there is no liability, even though recovery may be had under local
law.20 This amounts to adoption of the place of injury rule. Since the
law of the place of injury does not allow recovery, there is no right;
17 TREsTAT mNT, Co micT OF LAws § 377, n. 5 (1934).
28 See Mattox v. News Syndicate Co., 176 F.2d 897, (2d Cir. 1949) (domicile);
Dale System, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 527 (1953) (place of business). For
general discussions see Leflar, The Single Publication Rule, 25 RocKy M. L. REv. 335(1953) ; Ludwig, "Peace of Mind" in 48 Pieces v. Uniform Right of Privacy, 32 MINN.
L. RE~v. 734 (1948) ; Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 MicH. L. Ray. 59 (1953).
19 For an excellent discussion see Ford, Interspousal Liability for Automobile Acci-
dents in the Conflict of Laws: Law and Reason Versus the Restatement, 15 U. Pmr.
L. REV. 397 (1954). For cases see Annot., 22 A.L.R.2d 1249 (1951).2 0 Cf. Dawson v. Dawson, 224 Ala. 13, 138 So. 414 (1931) ; Gray v. Gray, 87 N.H.
82, 174 AU. 508 (1934) ; Coster v. Coster, 289 N.Y. 438, 46 N.E.2d 509 (1943).
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the plaintiff has no valid claim anywhere. Second, if suit is at a forum
not necessarily the marital domicile and the injury is incurred in a
state where responsibility exists, recovery is allowed if recovery may
also be had under the law of the forum." Again, this amounts to
adoption of the place of injury rule. The law at the place of injury
creates a right which is enforceable at the forum. Since recovery may
be had at both the forum and the place of the injury, no interest at
the forum precludes the suit. Third, if suit is brought at the marital
domicile, but there is no interspousal responsibility under the law there,
no recovery can be had even though the defendant spouse would be
liable under the law at the place of injury.2" The reason given is that
to permit recovery would violate a strong sense of local policy. How-
ever, it should be kept in mind that the policy here is not that of the
forum as such, but that of the marital domicile."
In spite of the fact that married women have long since been
emancipated from their common law disabilities, in a number of states
the common law inability of one spouse to hold the other responsible
for personal injuries has survived. " A reason sometimes given is that
to allow suit would encourage collusion.25 Another and the more usual
reason is that to permit an action to be brought would disturb the
peace and harmony of the marital relationship." Also, internal family
quarrels should not be aired in court. In addition, in some of the
community property states, a reason for the inability of the wife to
sue her husband for personal injuries inflicted by him grows out of
local community and separate property classifications. In Texas, for
example, the sum which may be recovered by one spouse from the
21 Cf. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Blake, 94 N.H. 141, 47 A2d 874 (1946);
Bogen v. Bogen, 219 N.C. 51, 12 S.E.2d 649 (1941).
22 Cf. Kircher v. Kircher, 288 Mich. 669, 286 N.W. 120 (1939) ; Kyle v. Kyle, 210
Minn. 204, 297 N.W. 744 (1941) ; Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E2d 597 (1936).2 3 Local public policy is, of course, often used as a convenient tool to evade applica-
tion of a foreign rule of law which the court may not like. A court may say, for
example, "This is a case for application of the law of the place of injury but our local
policy precludes enforcement of the foreign created right." In the husband and wife
cases, where the suit is at the marital domicile and the law there forbids recovery, the
policy which comes into play is the domiciliary policy. Recovery is in effect denied
because no recovery can be had under the domiciliary law. Similar results have been
reached where suit against a husband has been predicated on an injury inflicted by the
wife in a state under the local laws of which the husband would be responsible. Since
at common law a husband is responsible for the torts of his wife it could hardly be
said that "to enforce the foreign law" would conflict with some deep-rooted Anglo-
American sentiment. When the domiciliary forum holds that the plaintiff cannot
recover it in fact gives effect to local law as the domiciliary law. Cf. Siegman v.
Meyer, 100 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1938).
24 See Ford, op. cit., supra, n. 20.
25 See Newton v. Weber, 119 Misc. 240, 196 N.Y. Supp. 113 (1922).
28 See PROssER, ToRTs 903 (1941).
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other falls into the community regime because under the Texas Con-
stitution all acquisitions by either spouse during coverture are com-
munity property unless acquired by gift, devise, or descent. Since a
judgment, if recovered, would be payable out of community property,
it does not make sense to permit recovery if the amount recoverable
is to be immediately returned to the community estate.
Inasmuch as the reasons given for the inability of one spouse to
sue the other for personal injuries in some of the noncommunity states
is that to permit suit would disturb the peace and harmony of the
marital relationship, the matter of interspousal responsibility is not
based on ordinary concepts of tort liability but on concepts of domestic
relations. In the community states an additional notion is that the
local marital property law precludes recovery. Both marital property
and family law are by most courts regarded as within the peculiar
domain of the marital domicile." In reality, then, the forum, which is
also the marital domicile, when it denies recovery even though the law
of the place of the injury would allow it, is giving effect to its own law
because of its interest in the interspousal relations. Upon balance, for
reasons already given, disregard of the law at the place of injury seems
quite justifiable, not because to give effect to that law would be re-
pugnant to the forum on some ground of morals or sound ethics, but
because the domiciliary forum is convinced that the reasons behind
its local rule create a local interest which calls for application of local
domiciliary law. It might be added that when suit is brought at a
place other than the marital domicile, the forum should give effect to
the interest at the marital domicile since the existence or nonexistence
of liability is not a matter of liability fixing because of the injury, but
one of interspousal responsibility arising out of domiciliary notions
as to the relationship of husband and wife.
A question might be raised as to the constitutional power of a court
to apply any law other than that of the place of the injury. Fifty
years ago this would have posed a serious problem. Beginning with
Allgeyer v. Louisiana,29 decided in 1897, there have intermittently run
through the Supreme Court decisions involving the propriety of action
taken by state courts in the field of conflict of laws, notions of terri-
toriality of law by virtue of which a state may not give its local law
2 7 TEx. CoNsT. art. 15, § 16, (TEx. REV. Civ. ST. 1948).
28 See for a general discussion of marital property, Stumberg, Marital Property
Rights and The Conflict of Laws, 11 TEX. L. Rxv. 53 (1932). See also Cleveland,
Status in Common Law, 38 HARV. L. REv. 1074 (1925).
20 Allgeyer v. Louisianan, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
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extraterritorial effect. The Allgeyer case involved a criminal prosecu-
tion," but there are numerous decisions in which the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment and, to some extent, the full faith and
credit clause of the original Constitution"' have been resorted to to
strike down state decisions which in the opinion of the Supreme Court
constituted an unwarranted attempt to give effect to local law in the
fields of torts and contracts. Under the language employed in some of
the earlier decisions the scope of state legislative and judicial power
in this respect was quite restricted indeed. An example is the point
of view expresed in Western Union Tel. Co. v. Brown.2
In that case a message announcing a death was sent from South
Carolina to the District of Columbia. A delay in its delivery took place
because of negligence in the District. The South Carolina Supreme
Court allowed recovery for mental anguish which was not allowable
under the circumstances in the District. The case was taken to the
Supreme Court of the United States where Mr. Justice Holmes, after
repeating the language of the Slater case, added, "[W]hen a state
attempts ... to affect conduct outside of its jurisdiction, or the conse-
quences of such conduct, and to infringe upon the power of the United
States [within the District of Columbia] it must fail." The decision
thus incorporated notions of territoriality of law with a resulting
theory of obligatory enforcement of vested rights into the due process
clause of the Constitution. There are other cases in which the Supreme
Court through resort to notions of foreign-created rights or to analo-
gous theories placed severe limitations on the power of a state court
to disregard what was thought to be the proper foreign law.8 How-
ever, a different course was set by then Mr. Justice Stone in Alaska
Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n of Cal." One Palma
had been employed, under a contract of hiring entered into in Cali-
fornia, to work in a cannery in Alaska during the salmon season. The
contract provided that if the employee suffered injury the Alaska
Workmen's Compensation Act would apply. Despite this provision
Palma made his claim for compensation for an injury incurred in
Alaska before the California board. Compensation under the Call-
80 A Louisiana statute made it a criminal offense for a citizen of Louisiana to take
out insurance outside the state.
81 Cf. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542 (1914). See Hartford Acci-
dent & Indem. Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143 (1933); Bradford Elec.
Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932). See generally Hilpert & Cooley, The
Federal Constitution and The Choice of Law, 25 WAsH. U. L. Q. 27 (1939).
32 234 U.S. 542 (1914).
33 See Hilpert & Cooley, op. cit., supra n. 31.
34294 U.S. 532 (1935).
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fornia act was allowed by the California commission. Its action was
affirmed by the California courts upon the statutory ground that the
California act is applicable when the claimant is a resident of Cali-
fornia and the contract of employment was made in that state. The
case went to the Supreme Court of the United States on a contention
that there had been a denial of due process in giving effect to the law
of California and a denial of full faith and credit in not remitting the
claimant to Alaska where he was injured. 5 Mr. Justice Stone was of
the opinion that the interests of California and Alaska were such as
to permit each to apply at home its own law. In this connection refer-
ence should be made to a later decision in which the Court upheld
application of the California act in a situation where the employee, a
citizen of Massachusetts, was injured in California while temporarily
working there. 6 The two cases taken together mean, of course, that
the interest of a state may be such as to permit it to apply its own
law at home without violating principles of due process or full faith
and credit.
It might be urged that the compensation cases stand on separate
ground because compensation acts were enacted with special social
and economic purposes in mind, protection of injured industrial
workers and their dependents through a system which passes on the
cost or part of it to the consumer, with the risk to be normally spread
through resort to insurance. Consequently it might be said that
greater leeway has been and should be permitted in the process of
extending the scope of the local law to those who according to local
theories come within its protective coverage. Undoubtedly, state
courts have been exceedingly liberal in giving extraterritorial effect
to local compensation acts because of humanitarian ideas.8" However,
although with frequent disagreement among the members of the Court,
permissive weighing and balancing of the conflicting claims and in-
terests abroad and at the forum has been approved in decisions by
the Supreme Court in fields other than workmen's compensation. 8
While the cases, taken as a whole, have not always involved tortious
35 The United States Constitution (art. 4, see. 1) provides for full faith and credit
to "Public Acts, Records and Judicial Proceedings." The contention that full faith
and credit must be given to legislative acts is of relatively recent origin. 62 STAT. 947
(1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1950) now specifically provides for full faith and credit to
legislative acts.36 Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comnim'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
37 For a good general discussion of the extraterritorial effect of compensation acts
see Cowan, Jr., Extraterritorial Application of Workmen's Compensation Laws-A
Suggested Solution, 33 TEx. L. REv. 917 (1955).88 Cf. Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1941). First Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. United
Air Lines Inc., 342 U.S. 39 (1952) ; Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953).
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injuries, two cases decided within the past five or six years have par-
ticularly important bearing on the choice a state court may make in
applying some law other than that of the place of the injury when suit
is for a tortious injury. The cases are Carroll v. Lanza and Watson
v. Employers Liability Assur. Corp., Ltd." In Carroll, the plaintiff
was the employee of one Hogan who was working as a subcontractor
for the defendant Lanza, the general contractor. The plaintiff's con-
tract of employment with Hogan was made in Missouri where both
resided. He was injured in Arkansas where the work of his employer,
the subcontractor, was performed. The Missouri workmen's compen-
sation act provides that it "shall exclude all other rights and remedies
*.. at common law or otherwise." However, under Arkansas law an
employee of a subcontractor may recover damages from the general
contractor for injuries attributable to him. The lower court was of
the opinion that effect should be given to Missouri law as a public act
entitled to full faith and credit. Therefore recovery was denied. How-
ever, the Supreme Court held that "Missouri can make her Compensa-
tion Act exclusive, if she chooses, and enforce it as she pleases within
her borders.... Arkansas can adopt Missouri's policy if she likes.
Or... she may supplement it or displace it with another, insofar as
remedies for acts occurring within her boundaries are concerned."
In Watson,4 the question was whether the plaintiff could bring a
direct action under a Louisiana statute against an insurer who had
undertaken to cover the liability of the alleged tort-feasor in a policy
of insurance negotiated and issued in Chicago and Massachusetts. The
policy contained the usual provision prohibiting an action against the
insurer prior to final judicial determination of the insured's liability,
a provision which is valid under the laws of Illinois and Massachu-
setts. However, under the law of Louisiana suit may be brought
directly against a liability insurer despite a policy provision to the
contrary. After discussing the interest that Louisiana has in injuries
to its own citizens and even to those who are not citizens but are in-
jured within her borders, Mr. Justice Black, who wrote the opinion of
the Court, commented as follows: "Of course Massachusetts also has
some interest in the policy sued on in this case. The insurance contract
was formally executed in that State.... But plainly these interests
cannot outweigh the interest of Louisiana in taking care of those
injured in Louisiana."
89 349 U. S. 408 (1955).
40 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
41 Ibid.
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While in the Carroll and Watson 2 cases application of the law of
the place of injury was permitted, room was left for a counterplay of
other interests of other states which would permit application of local
law at home. Permissive, rather than compulsory, application of the
law of the place of injury was the rule of decision.43
The decisions just discussed do not mean that the place of injury
should never be regarded as the proper point of reference to determine
tort liability. They do, however, indicate that there are some situa-
tions which have been thought to call for departures and that departures
have been made. To apply the law of the place of the injury, as was
done in the Texas Carter" case, makes little sense when the negligence
which caused the plane to go off course occurred in Texas, where both
the plaintiffs and defendant were residents of that state, and particu-
larly when the end result was that the defendant escaped all responsi-
bility. By way of contrast application by the Minnesota Supreme
Court of the Minnesota "Dram Shop Act" to a Wisconsin injury seems
sound if one takes into consideration that the purpose of the act was
found by the Minnesota Supreme Court to be to curb those who sell
intoxicants from making unlawful sales in Minnesota. In other situa-
tions there is much to be said for the departures from the Restatement.
42 Nn. 39 and 40 supra.
43 Attention should be called here to two holdings to the effect that if there is no
interest at the forum it may not apply its own substantive law. Cf. Home Ins. Co. v.
Dick. 281 U.S. 397 (1930) and John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S.
178 (1936). In the Dick case suit was on a policy of insurance issued by a Mexican
company. The policy covered a Mexican risk. It contained a provision to the effect
that suit could not be brought unless filed within a year from the date of loss. Suit on
the policy was brought in Texas. A Texas statute was held by the Texas Supreme
Court to invalidate this policy provision. This the Supreme Court held could not be
done. In the Yates case a policy of life insurance was delivered to the insured in New
York. Under New York law the policy was void because of the falsity of certain
statements in the application. Upon the death of the insured the widow sued in Georgia.
The plaintiff contended that the insured had made true statements to the agent of the
insurer but that the agent had put down untrue statements in the application. Under
Georgia law the fact that the insured gave the agent the correct answers constituted
a defense. The Georgia courts permitted the plaintiff to recover. Its decision was
overruled by the Supreme Court.
In both cases the forum had no connection with the insurance policies. In both,
local law was permitted by the state court to override a defense which the insurer
had under the terms of the policies. The policy provisions were valid under the law
of the place where the risks were located and the policies were issued.
The two cases might be compared with Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941). A
policy of insurance was issued in New York on the life of a resident of Texas. It was
assigned to persons not having an insurable interest in the life of the insured. This
resulted in the invalidity of the policy as to the assignee under Texas law, but not
under New York law. The insurer interpleaded the Texas heirs of the deceased in-
sured, who were claiming the proceeds of the policy, in Texas and the assignees in a
federal court in Texas. It was held that Texas law applied because the deceased was a
resident of Texas, even though it was conceded a different result might have been
reached in New York had the petition for interpleader been filed there.
44 N. 5 supra.
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To look to the law of all of the states where a libel or slander of
national character may have had its impact" would only result in
confusion because of the multiplicity of independent suits and con-
fficting theories of liability. It would seem clear enough that more
desirable results can be reached by reference of the matter of the
nature and extent of liability to the law of a single state such as that
of the domicile or that of the principal place of business of the plaintiff.
If a court comes to the conclusion, as did the Connecticut courts,"'
that the intent of the Connecticut legislature was to encourage exercise
of care by a bailor in selecting a bailee to whom he rents or loans a car
by imposing responsibility on him for the activities of his bailee, there
is not much that can be said by way of criticism of its position that
the primary factor for liability is not the injury as such, but the inci-
dents of the bailment contract made in Connecticut. Emphasis on
the bailment factor naturally leads to reference to the law of the place
of the bailment. Similar consideration should control where the
matter involved is one of interspousal responsibility for personal
injury. As has already been pointed out the basic reasons for preserv-
ing interspousal immunity in some of the states relate not simply to
compensation for injuries, but to factors arising out of marital rela-
tions or marital property rights, matters which in other respects are
determined by the domiciliary law. There is a partial recognition of
the superior claim of the domiciliary law when recovery is denied at
the marital domicile if the law there does not permit recovery, even
though recovery may be had at the place of injury. Widespread
recognition of the superior claim of the domiciliary law'7 would further
uniform results in the enforcement or denial of claims, the existence
of which depend not on tort policy but on factors pertaining to the
status of husband and wife.
45 See n. 18 supra.
46 See n. 16 supra.
47 Possibly a judgment secured in a non-domiciliary forum upon a theory that the
law of the place of injury controls would not have to be given full faith and credit at
the domicile. A judgment is of course entitled to full faith and credit, but the forum
is not required to furnish a court in which suit may be brought. In Texas, for example,
a wife may not sue her husband except where some claim involving her separate
property is involved. A Texas court might well refuse to permit the wife to sue on
the judgment on this ground. Cf. Weidman v. Weidman, 274 Mass. 118, 174 N.E. 206(1931), in which the Massachusetts courts refused to give effect to a New York
maintenance order granted as an adjunct to judicial separation since in Massachusetts
such an order would not be enforced at the instance of the wife during coverture. See
also Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co., 191 U.S. 373 (1903) in
which it was held that the New York courts did not have to entertain jurisdiction of a
suit on a judgment obtained abroad. Under local New York law a foreign corpora-
tion may not sue another foreign corporation on a foreign cause of action. The suit
on the judgment was between two foreign corporations.
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